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A Conservative Defense of Romer v. Evanst
DALE CARPENTER"
INTRODUCTION
A conservative defense ofRomer v. Evans?' How could a conservative defend the
U.S. Supreme Court's decision to strike down a Colorado state constitutional
amendment repealing and prohibiting local gay civil rights laws? Wasn't the decision
an unprincipled departure from the intentions of the Framers, the language of the
Constitution, and the traditions of the nation? Wasn't it, in short, the very archetype
of liberal judicial activism abhorred by conservatives?
Many conservatives, including conservative legal scholars, have apparently thought
so. Evans has been blasted in the conservative opinion pages of the NationalReview2
3
and the Weekly Standard,
among many other popular-press outlets.4 Conservative
legal scholars have launched a frontal assault on Evans, starting with an attack in the
HarvardJournalofLaw & PublicPolicy.5 These writers have called Evans "a result
in search of a reason,"6 and "the most result-oriented decision issued by the U.S.
Supreme Court since Roe v. Wade."' They even held out the threat that some people,

I Copyright 2001 by Dale Carpenter.
* Associate Professor, University of Minnesota Law School. The basic ideas in this
Article were originally delivered, in much shorter form, in a speech I gave to the Houston
chapter of the Federalist Society in July 1996. I describe some of the circumstances
surrounding that speech in the Conclusion. I would like to thank Dan Burk, Don Dripps, AnneMarie Eileraas, Daniel Farber, Christopher Leslie, Brett McDonnell, David McGowan,
Miranda McGowan, Michael Paulsen, Suzanna Sherry, Michael McConnell, Julius Turman,
and Ernest Young for their helpful comments.
1. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2. Listingwhatitregards as liberal-activist decisions in the 1990s, the magazine criticized
the Evans Court for "impi[ying] that objective morality... cannot be the basis of legislation."
Judge Not, NAT'L REv., Sept. 27, 1999, at 12, 12. Whether Amendment 2 amounted to the
enactment of some "objective morality," and whether Evans held that "objective morality"
could not be the basis of legislative action, are contested questions.
3. See David Frum, The Courts,GayMarriage,andthePopularWill, WKLY. STANDARD,
Sept. 30, 1996, at 30, 31 (criticizing Evans as "murky and undisciplined").
4. See, e.g., George F. Will, Editorial, "TerminalSilliness",WASH. POST, May22, 1996,
at A21.
5. See John Daniel Dailey & Paul Farley, Colorado's Amendment 2: A Result in Search
ofa Reason, 20 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 215 (1996). Not every commentator has concluded
that Evans is completely unconservative. Louis Seidman has argued that, "for all its implicit
radicalism, Romer is . . .profoundly conservative." Louis Michael Seidman, Romer's
Radicalism:The Unexpected Revival of Warren CourtActivism, 1996 Sup. CT. REv.67, 70.
Seidman suggests that Evans is the product of four Republican appointees (Justices Stevens,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter) who see themselves as part of the "endangered tradition" of
moderate Republicanism. Id. at 71. Seidman also links Evans to Warren Court-era activism
that, in conservative fashion, "serves to stabilize the system even as it destabilizes individual
components of it." Id. at 120. Of course, the possibility that Evans "reviv[ed] Warren Court
activism" is exactly what conservatives fear about it. Id. at 67.
6. Dailey & Farley, supranote 5, at 268.
7. Id. at 215.

INDIANA LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 76:403

frustrated with another countermajoritarian decision by the Court, might react
violently to the decision: "Increasingly,... individuals who feel marginalized by
unresponsive governments are seeking to make themselves heard throughboth violent
and non-violent means."8
Justice Scalia himself, perhaps the most visible judicial conservative in America
today, denounced the Court for imposing on the nation its elitist attitudes about
sexual morality,9 and for "tak[ing] sides in this culture war."'" Scalia, and no doubt
many conservative legal scholars, insisted that Evans "has no foundation in American
constitutional law."" He maintained that holding the Colorado law unconstitutional
"is an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will."' 2 This is the most serious
charge a conservative can make against an opinion. Thus, Scalia drew on a recurrent
theme of conservative constitutional jurisprudence: judges must not substitute their
own political views for rigorous, interpretive analysis rooted in the text and history
of the Constitution. 3
Contrasted with these conservative critiques of Evans, this Article places the
decision within the foundational strain of modem conservatism. This conservatism
prefers an incremental method and pace of change, outcomes that permit and
encourage the development of a deliberated consensus on contentious issues, and
substantive results that both uphold the nation's highest traditions and answer the
Framers' concern about factionalism. Thus, I begin to sketch an alternative
conservative response to Evans, one that differs from the attack begun by selfdescribed conservatives in the popular media and in legal journals.
I argue that Evans is itself a modest opinion, conservative both in tone and
substance, upholding the nation's tradition ofpolitical equality, and answering certain
anxieties the Framers of the Constitution and of the Fourteenth Amendment had
about the nation's constitutional system. Thus, Evans can be defended as an
originalist decision. This is a more flexible approach than a strict originalism that
considers only the specific meaning the Constitution's authors ascribed to its
provisions and attempts to recreate what their feelings, bound up in the
understandings of an earlier era, would have been about an issue they could hardly
have conceived. No reputable conservative legal scholar has adopted such a wooden
approach to originalism. 4 At any rate, I doubt the stricter form of originalism is even

8. Id. at 267-68.
9. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996).
10. Id. at 652.
11. Id. at 653.

12. Id.
13. See generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THm POiTiCAL
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
14. Bork, for example, recognizes the need for flexibilityin applying the Framers' concerns
to changed and unforeseen circumstances. See id. at 167-68 ("'It is the task of thejudges in this
generation to discern how the framers' values, defined in the context of the world they knew,
apply to the world we know."' (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(en banc) (Bork, J., concurring))).
Ajudge who refuses to see new threats to an established constitutional value, and
hence provides a crabbed interpretation that robs a provision of its full, fair, and
reasonable meaning, fails in his judicial duty. That duty, it is worth repeating, is
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possible, much less capable of principled application to modem problems.
Throughout this Article, I use the word "conservative" in its Burkean sense 5 to
mean a preference for adhering, whether in law or more broadly in government and
culture, to traditional practices and mores. This distinguishes it from what is more
properly thought of as libertarianism, rooted in the work of philosophers like John
Stuart Mill, but often popularly called "conservative." A libertarian case might also
be made for (or perhaps against) the outcome in Evans, but that is not my aim.
The conservative approach used here is also distinct from modem social (or
religious) conservatism, which purports to have a fixed and immutable vision of
society based on natural law (or religious principles) and hardly hesitates to impose
that vision through compulsion of law. Burkean conservatism, as we shall see, favors
traditional practices and mores but is not static and is not impervious to advances in
the state of positive knowledge about a subject.'"
I first outline the majority and dissenting opinions in Evans to identify what I take
to be the decision's import. Next, I outline some of the main themes of conservative
political and legal thought, concentrating especially on Edmund Burke. I argue in
particular that the common conception of Burke as an intransigent defender of the
status quo and of present traditions and practices is a misreading of him. Finally, I
discuss the conservative underpinnings for Evans in light of this intellectual history,
with an emphasis on the profoundly conservative instincts revealed in the Court's
opinion and also on the ways in which Evans addresses fears expressed by the
Framers, most notably James Madison.

I. EVANS'S LOGIC
In 1992, the voters of Colorado, by a margin of 53.4% to 46.6%," passed an
amendment to the state constitution. The law, popularly known as Amendmeni 2, was
the subject of Evans. It is important to recall what the amendment said and did. This
is what it said:
Neither the State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor
any of its agencies, political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall
enact, adopt or enforce any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby
homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices or relationships
shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of, or entitle any person or class of
persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected status
or claim of discrimination. t8

to ensure that the powers and freedoms the founders specified are made effective
in today's altered world. The evolution of doctrine to accomplish that end
contravenes no postulate ofjudicial restraint.
Id. at 169 (citing Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Bork, J.,
concurring))).
15. See discussion infra Part II.A.
16. For an application of Burkean thought to constitutional method, see Ernest Young,
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72
N.C.L. REv. 619 (1994).
17. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
18. COLO. CONST. art. I, § 30b (held unconstitutional in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
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The effect of Amendment 2 was to repeal ordinances that had been adopted in Aspen,
Boulder, and Denver protecting individuals from discrimination based on sexual
orientation in employment, housing, and public accommodations. 9 The ordinances
had protected homosexuals (and heterosexuals) from discrimination in hotels,
restaurants, hospitals, dental clinics, theaters, banks, common carriers, travel and
insurance agencies, and any other shops or stores dealing with goods or services of
any kind. All these protections, insofar as they protected gays, vanished in the
aftermath of Amendment 2.
The amendment also swept aside an executive order protecting state employees
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.2" It nullified a provision of the
Colorado Insurance Code forbidding health insurance providers from determining
insurability and premiums based on sexual orientation.2 Further, it repealed policies
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation such as those at state colleges,
including Colorado State University and the Metropolitan State College of Denver,
which prohibited school-sponsored social clubs from discriminating in membership
on the basis of sexual orientation.'
Not satisfied with repealing all existing civil rights protections for homosexuals,
it declared that no such protections could be reenacted, short of seeking and obtaining
an amendment to the state constitution.n
The campaign that preceded the vote was marked by an extraordinarily nasty series
of verbal and physical attacks on gays in the state. On the eve of the election,
supporters of the amendment passed out approximately 800,000 flyers asserting,
among other things: "Sexual molestation of children is a large part of many
homosexuals' lifestyle-part of the very lifestyle 'gay-rights' activists want
'
government to give special class, ethnic status!"24
Other campaign materials
distributed by supporters of the amendment erroneously charged that "homosexuals
'
(Contrary to these
commit between 1/3 and 1/2 of all recorded child molestations."25
charges, several studies have concluded that the overwhelming majority of child
molestations are not committed by gays.)26 An increase in anti-gay hate crimes in
Colorado accompanied the campaign to pass the amendment.

635-36 (1996)).
19. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996) (citing ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE § 13-98
(1977), BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE § 12-1-1 to -11 (1987), and DENVER, COLO., REV. MUN.
CODE art. IV, § 28-91 to -116 (1991)).
20. Id. at 626.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 627.
23. Id.
24. Joseph S. Jackson, PersonsofEqual Worth: Romer v. Evans andthe PoliticsofEqual
Protection,45 UCLA L. REV. 453, 459 n.28 (1997).
25. Id. at 460 n.30.
26. See id. at 460 n.32 (citing Kurt Freund et al., Heterosexuality,Homosexuality, and
Erotic Age Preferences, 26 J. SEX RES. 107 (1989), A. Nicholas Groth & H. Jean Birnbaum,
Adult Sexual Orientationand Attraction to UnderagePersons,7 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV.
175, 181 (1978), and Carol Jenny et al., Are Children at Risk for Sexual Abuse by
Homosexuals?, 94 PEDIATRICS 41,41 (1994)).
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Opponents of Amendment 2 went to court to block its enforcement on the grounds
that it violated the U.S. Constitution's Equal Protection Clause.27 They secured an
injunction, which was upheld by the Colorado Supreme Court on the grounds that
Amendment 2 infringed the fundamental right of gays to participate in the political
process by making them seek redress and protection at a higher level of governmental
decisionmaking than others.' The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, but on a different
theory.
In considering how the Court reached its result, it is useful to recall the terms in
which Justice Kennedy's majority opinion described the effect of Amendment 2 on
the legal status of gays. The opinion described Amendment 2 as "[s]weeping and
r 3
comprehensive";29 "farreaching";30 "exceptional";
' "unusual"; 32 "unprecedented" in
33
our history and law; having "severe consequence[s]";34 placing a "special," "broad
and undifferentiated disability" on homosexuals; 3 "singling out" gays;36 putting gays
in a "solitary class"; 37 making gays "a stranger to [the state's] laws"; 38 and ultimately,
'
'irrational."39
Contrast that rather dark picture of Amendment 2 to the benign one painted by
Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in
dissent' ° Scalia described Amendment 2 as a "modest attempt by seemingly tolerant
Coloradans" to protect"traditional sexual mores" against the onslaught of"politically
powerful" and wealthy homosexuals demanding "special" or "preferential"
treatment.4 Scalia argued that the hostility reflected by Amendment 2 toward
homosexuals was "the smallest conceivable," and concluded that Amendment 2 was
"an entirely" and "eminently reasonable" provision.42
This difference in description goes to the larger issue ofwhythe Court struck down
Amendment 2. In analyzing the law, the Court applied a rational basis test to
determine whether it violated the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.43 This test is the least demanding level of scrutiny the Court
applies to any law. It simply looks at whether the law bears a rational relationship to
some legitimate purpose. In applying the test, the Court looks at both the means used
and the end sought to determine whether the law conforms to the Constitution.

27. Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1272 n.2 (Colo. 1993) (en banc).
28. Id. at 1270.
29. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996).
30. Id.
31. Id. at 632.
32. Id. at 633.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 629.
35. Id. at 631-32.
36. Id. at 633.
37. Id. at 627.
38. Id. at 635.
39. Id. at 632.
40. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 636, 638.
42. Id. at 644-45, 653.
43. See id. at 632.
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But the Court did not address, let alone decide, the level of scrutiny to be given to
laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.4 Although many lower
courts have assumed that rational basis scrutiny applies to classifications based on
sexual orientation, that determination awaits some future case.45
In this case, the Court applied the least demanding constitutional
standard-presumably on the theory that if Amendment2 could notpass that standard
then it would not pass any higher standard. Justice Kennedy's opinion held that
"Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this conventional [rational basis] inquiry"
for two reasons.46
A. Means: Too Narrow and Too Broad

First, the Court said, "the amendment has the peculiar property ofimposing abroad
and undifferentiated disability on a single named group."'4 Note that the opinion
describes the law as combining two features that, together, create an equal protection
problem. On the one hand, its prohibitions were "broad and undifferentiated."4 It
barred a wide array of legal protections in everything from employment to insurance.
On the other hand, the law targeted "a single named group," gays.4 9 The Court said
that this combination was an "exceptional and... invalid form of legislation."5
That conclusion suggests the Court may be recognizing a category of laws that per
se violate the principle of equal protection, with no further consideration of "levels
of scrutiny" or other analysis needed. How might such a per se unconstitutional law
be identified? Justice Kennedy's description of Amendment 2 suggests an answer.
"[Amendment 2] is at once too narrow and too broad. It identifies persons by a single
trait and then denies them protection across the board. The resulting disqualification
of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is
unprecedented in our jurisprudence."'" The opinion added that, "It is not within our
constitutional tradition to enact laws of this sort."52 Laws of what sort? Again, the
opinion points to those laws that identify a single class of people and broadly deny
that class legal protections. The Court called this "a denial of equal protection of the
laws in the most literal sense."5'

44. See id.

45. For an argument that legislation classifying on the basis of sexual orientation should
receive strict scrutiny, see Kenji Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literary Argument for
Heightened Scrutinyfor Gays, 96 CoLUM. L. REv. 1753 (1996).
46. Evans, 517 U.S. at 632.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The laws, ordinances, and policies repealed and prohibited by Amendment 2 also
protected heterosexuals from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. at 626. But,

Amendment 2 removed protections only from the group that needed them most, homosexuals.
Id. at 627.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 633.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.

2001]

A CONSERVATIVE DEPENSE OFEVANS

Justice Scalia characterized the Court's conclusion here as follows: "The central
thesis of the Court's reasoning is that any group is denied equal protection when, to
obtain advantage ... ,it must have recourse to a more general and hence more
difficult level of political decision making than others." 5 He added, "The world has
never heard of such a principle."'
Scalia is right: The world has never heard of such aprinciple because that is not the
principle the Court adopted in Evans. If it were as Scalia noted, multilevel
decisionmaking in our republic, proceeding from state constitution to state legislature
to counties to cities and down to departments, would be constitutionally unworkable
since a decision made at any level above the bottom would cause a disadvantaged
group to seek redress at a governmental level higher than the base.
However, I read the Court's opinion to mean that a broad denial of legal protections
targeted at a single group is unconstitutional at whatever level of government the
decision is madeY So, for example, a city would not be free under this reading of
Evans to enact a sweeping denial of legal protections to a single class even within its
own narrow jurisdiction.
This reading may help explain why the Court originally remanded a case in which
a Cincinnati ordinance barred legal protections for gays from its city charter and
ordered all city departments to end any nondiscrimination policies covering sexual
orientation they may have adopted.58 The Court vacated the opinion of the Sixth
Circuit, which had upheld the ordinance, and remanded the case for reconsideration
in light of Evans.59 Justice Scalia dissented from the granting of certiorari, arguing
that there was no reason for the Sixth Circuit to reconsider its opinion because Evans
stands only for the proposition that a state cannot force homosexuals to seek
protection through a state constitutional amendment.' Since a city is the "lowest
electoral subunit" homosexuals are at no disadvantage recognized in Evans,
according to Scalia.6"' If my reading of Evans is correct, however, Scalia missed the
point. Evans may have a broader, and different, impact on laws targeting gays than
he thins.62
My reading also suggests an answer to Justice Scalia's reliance on Bowers v.

55. Id. at 639 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Id.
57. See alsoDaniel Farber& Suzanna Sherry, The PariahPrinciple,13 CONST. COMMENT.
257 (1996).
58. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City ofCincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Note that, on remand, the Sixth Circuit affirmed its original decision, largely on the
grounds suggested by Justice Scalia's dissent from certiorari. Equal. Found. of Greater
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City ofCincinnati, 128 F.3d 289,297 (6th Cir. 1997). In rhetorical defiance
of the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit persisted in describing nondiscrimination laws
protecting gays as "special." Id. The Supreme Court then refused to grant review of the case.
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 525 U.S. 943 (1998). It's hard to
know what significance to draw from the denial of certiorari. The denial could mean that
Scalia's narrower reading ofEvans is right. Or it could mean the Court is inviting lower courts
to test the limits of the decision. Or it could mean nothing significant at all.
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Hardwick,63 the case that upheld a state's power to criminalize homosexual sodomy.'
Scalia argued that it made no sense to permit a state to criminalize same-sex sexual
relations, and yet forbid that state from withdrawing legal protections from the group
that engages in those very relations.6 According to Scalia, the greater power, to make
criminals of gays, includes the lesser power, to deny them what he called "special
protections." Of course, Scalia maybe right, and Hardwickmaybethe next casualty
of Evans. The Seventh Circuit certainly seems to think so.67
On the other hand, Hardwickinvolved a criminal prohibition on specific conduct;
it did not involve a sweeping denial of legal protections. 8 Although the criminal
prohibition as validated in Hardwick focused on a single class-those who engage
in same-sex sexual conduct-it did not withdraw that class generally from the
protection of the law.69 Thus, Scalia may have his "greater" and "lesser" powers
exactly backward. The state lacks the greater power to enact a sweeping denial of
rights but has the lesser power to focus its prohibitory efforts on discrete areas-like
the specific conduct at issue in Hardwick."
A similar response could be made to Scalia's fretting that polygamy may now be
the law of the land.7 That is, the state could outlaw the practice of polygamy (given
a non-animus-based justification for doing so) but could not broadly withdraw legal
protections from polygamists, notto mention withdraw such protections frompeople
with a "polygamist orientation."'

63. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
64. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 640 (1996) (citing Hardwick,478 U.S. at 186).
65. Id. at 640-41.
66. Id. at 641.
67. Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 n. 12 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[Hardwick] will soon
be eclipsed in the area of equal protection by the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans."
(citation omitted)).
68. See Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 188.
69. Superficially, the Georgia law did not even target a single status-defined class
(homosexuals) since it also applied to opposite-sex sodomy. See id. at 188 n. I. Hardwick's
focus on same-sex sodomy, rather than the orientation ofthe participants, means Georgia could
constitutionally prohibit same-sex sodomy committed by bisexuals and heterosexuals as well
as by homosexuals. In this sense, unlike Colorado's Amendment 2 (which prohibited protection
only for homosexual orientation), the Georgia law was not even targeted at a single class. On
the other hand, like Amendment 2, the Georgia law fell especially harshly on homosexuals.
Homosexuals have few other viable sexual outlets.
70. For a syllogistic critique of Scalia's argument, see Lynn A.Baker, The MissingPages
of the Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. CoLO. L. REv. 387, 389-99 (1997).
71. Evans, 517 U.S. at 648.
72. For a comparison, see Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (holding states may
criminalize use of drugs but may not criminalize person's status as a drug addict). Cass
Sunstein has argued, "The fact that the underlying conduct can be criminalized is irrelevant to
the [equal protection] problem; it is always immaterial to an equal protection challenge that
members of the victimized group are engaging in conduct that could be prohibited on a general
basis." Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientationandthe Constitution:A Note on the Relationship
Between Due Processand Equal Protection,55 U.CHI. L. REv. 1161, 1167 (1988).
Another distinction between polygamy and homosexual orientation is that, while a person
can cease being a polygamist, the best available evidence supports the conclusion that
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It is also worth noting that Hardwickwas a substantive due process case; it did not
involve an equal protection challenge.' The Court might well come to a different
conclusion about the constitutionality of sodomy laws under an equal protection
analysis, since equal protection analysis has been less rooted than due process in the
vindication of historically recognized rights.74
This distinction of Amendment 2 from the sodomy and polygamy cases also
suggests that a more narrowly drafted state constitutional amendment aimed at
homosexuals or some other class of citizens might survive Evans, although it might
suffer some other equal protection or constitutional infirmity. A more narrow denial
of specific protections might work. For example, a statute that more narrowly
withdrew legal protections from discrimination in housing in cases where a landlord
claims some religious objection to homosexuality might well survive anEvansattack.
After Evans, a city's specific nondiscrimination ordinance could be repealed by the
state or by the city itself. A state is also free to rearrange the distribution of
decisionmaking between itself and its constituent subdepartinents (e.g., by requiring
that certain kinds of decisions be made at the state level), but not in a way that
broadly targets a specific group. Further, a measure that comprehensively withdrew
statutory civil rights protections for allclasses of citizens at any level of government
might well survive my reading of Evans.
B. Ends: No Animus

The second constitutional infirmitywith Amendment 2, according to the Court, was
that it was adopted because of "animosity" towards gays.' "'[I]f the constitutional
conception of 'equal protection of the laws' means anything,"' said the Court, "'it
must at the very least mean that a bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimategovernmental interest."' 6 The Equal Protection
Clause of its own force prohibits the government frompursuing certain ends that are
otherwise constitutionally permissible. Thus, not only were the means chosen by
Colorado unconstitutional.' the bare desire to harm gays was also unconstitutional.
The Court noted that laws serving broad and ambitious purposes could justify the
imposition of incidental disadvantages on certain groups.78 But that is just it: to have
a constitutionally legitimate purpose, the disadvantage to the group mustbe incidental
to the law, not the purpose of the law.

homosexual orientation cannot be changed. See RICHARD A.POSNER, SEXANDREASON 101-06,

259-60 (1992). 1want to thank Christopher Leslie for reminding me of this difference.
73. For a discussion of the differences between a due process analysis and an equal
protection analysis as applied to Hardwick, see Sunstein, supra note 72,at 1161. But see
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 142-43

(1999) (arguing that "due process tradition is not static," and in the 1970s was "more dynamic
and forward-looking for gay people than equal protection cases were"); WilliamN. Eskridge,
Jr., DestabilizingDueProcessandEvolutiveEqualProection,
47 UCLAL. REV. 1183 (2000).
74. Sunstein, supra note 72, at 1161.

75. Evans, 517 U.S. at 634.
76. Id. (quoting United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
77. See discussion supra Part I.A.

78. Evans, 517 U.S. at 635.
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How did the Court know that the purpose of Amendment 2 was to harm gays? No
opinion polls were cited on the issue. No evidence of animus-based statements by
citizens or even by the drafters of the Amendment were adduced, although such
statements were certainly available if the Court had wanted to cite them. 79 Nothing
except the law itself was offered by the Court to demonstrate the impermissible
animosity.
Colorado never agreed Amendment 2 was an exercise in gay bashing. Instead, the
state said the Amendment was meant to protect the associational rights and religious
liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections to
homosexuality."0 It also cited its desire to conserve resources to fight discrimination
against other groups.8
But the Court found that the statute was so broad in relation to these purported
purposes that it is "impossible to credit them."82 To the Court, if these limited claimed
purposes were truly behind the Amendment, the effect was to take a sledgehammer
to a gnat, where a fly-swatter would do. Instead, Amendment 2, said the Court, "is
a classification ofpersons undertaken for its own sake.... classif[ying] homosexuals
not to further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else.""
Recall the Court reached that conclusion on the strength of Amendment 2's text, not
on the strength of any extrinsic evidence, despite the claims of the state that legitimate
ends justified its adoption."
That conclusion may have the most lasting effect on our constitutional landscape
as it regards classifications that affect gays. A tension courses through the majority
and dissenting opinions. The same tension has coursed through the political and
cultural wars on the place of gays in American society. That tension is on the question
of whether the types of legal protections from discrimination that gays sought in
Colorado accord "special" rights, or merely give substance to the promise of equality
in the law. Throughout his dissent, Justice Scalia characterized Amendment 2 as
doing nothing more than repealing "special" rights."5 The Court countered that the
legal protections repealed by Amendment 2 are not at all special.86
Whether a given right or protection can be characterized as "special" depends on
the baseline used to distinguish a "special" right from an "equal" right; in other
words, all rights given above the baseline are special while all those protected below
it ensure simple equality. Scalia clearly believes all legal protections that specifically
prohibit discrimination in any area on the basis of sexual orientation are special rights
granted to homosexuals. On the other hand, the enforcement of general laws and
policies that prohibit arbitrary discrimination may also prohibit discrimination on the
basis of homosexual conduct, on Scalia's view, without conferring special benefits
on homosexuals. These protections do not constitute special treatment and so fall
below Scalia's baseline. They fall below it because they are a part of generally
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
Evans, 517 U.S. at 635.
Id. at 630-31,635.
Id. at 635.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 636-53 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 631.
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applicable laws.
Nondiscrimination policies, on Scalia's account, afford special protection because
they single out homosexuals for protection. 7 But that distinction is untenable. As the
Court argued, even generally applicable laws must at some point draw lines around
the kinds of matters they will or will not address. 8
Take, for example, a law that prevented "arbitrary discrimination" by an agency of
the state. For Scalia, that would be a generally applicable law and thus not a special
protection for homosexuals or any other class. But at some point, the agency or a
court reviewing the agency's action must determine whether discrimination against
homosexuality is or is not arbitrary discrimination. At the moment it does, it will have
announced a policy protecting homosexuals from discrimination. It would then be a
special or preferential right Scalia says the state is free to withdraw.
This is not a purely hypothetical exercise. The courts reviewing Amendment 2 did
not resolve the question whether it withdrew the protection of generally applicable
laws from homosexuals. But it might easily have been read that way. And, on Scalia's
conception of special rights, a holding that Amendment 2 passed constitutional
muster would be a short step away from holding constitutional a law that withdrew
from homosexuals the protection of otherwise generally applicable laws, since every
generally applicable law could be recast as a special protection once it was applied
to prohibit discrimination against a homosexual on the basis of sexual orientation.
There is simply nothing in Scalia's analysis of Amendment 2 that would prevent this
monstrous result.
Perhaps in an attempt to avoid that difficulty, the Court implicitly suggested a
baseline of equal rights for gays somewhat higher than Scalia's. The amendment, said
the Court, did not deprive homosexuals of "special rights." 9
We find nothing special in the protections Amendment 2 withholds. These are

protections taken for granted by most people either because they already have
them or do not need them; these are protections against exclusion from an almost
limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life
in a free society."
By that statement, six justices of the U.S. Supreme Court effectively moved the
baseline for gays to a higher plane-one that recognizes that gays need the
protections abolished byAmnendment 2 simply in order to participate in ordinary civic
life in our society. That recognition marks a dramatic shift in basic outlook from the
Court that decided Hardwickten years before. And it is a shift that surely informed
the Court's judgment that Amendment 2 was based on nothing more than animus
against homosexuals. After all, ifAmendment 2 withdrew only special rights, it could
hardly be thought of as an act of pure animus. That was Scalia's view. 9 But
withdrawing measures that guarantee only equal rights raises more troubling
suspicions about the true purpose behind the law. Thus, the Court reached a different

87. See id. at 640-43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88.
89.
90.
91.

See id. at 631.
See id.
Id.
See generally id. at 636-53 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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conclusion than Scalia about what truly lay behind the law.
The implications of this new baseline may be more hortative than substantive. The
new baseline does not mean, for example, that to comply with equal protection a state
or municipality must protect gays from private discrimination. A state or city may
repeal its own gay civil rights protections after Evans as long as the repeal has a nonanimus-based justification. Such a justification would be easier to find in a narrow
repeal than in the kind of sweeping enactment at issue in Evans.
On the other hand, this new baseline may signal the Court's judgment that the
perceived social harm of homosexuality is not a legitimate concern of government,
as Scalia feared.9' The perceived social harm of homosexuality itself, unadorned by
other justifications unrelated to that perceived harm, may now be understood as
nothing more than animus against gays. This could mean that mere moral objections
to homosexuality are no longer sufficient to justify legislation directed at gays.
Indeed, it is hard to see how a court that implicitly worries that gays need protection
from discrimination to lead ordinary fives could conclude otherwise.
This could lead to a kind of unstated heightened scrutiny of legislative purposes
where classifications affecting homosexuals are concerned-a "souped-up"
rationality review.93 It is not enough, after Evans, for the state to offer morality-based
arguments alone for policies targeted at gays. And the broader the enactment the
greater the distrust of the state's facially non-animus-based justifications (e.g.,
landlords' religious liberty). This is considerably less deferential than what is usually
considered rationality review. It is a heightened scrutiny that dare not speak its name.
The judgment that morality alone is not enough to sustain laws targeting
homosexuals may have implications down the road for other legislative enactments
that disadvantage gays, such as criminal sodomy laws, the ban on gays in the military,
employment discrimination, anti-gay adoption laws, and even the ban on same-sex
marriages.94 Even if these laws are reviewed only under the rational basis test, as
applied in Evans, they may still be viewed as the legislative enactments of animus:
an impermissible purpose to disadvantage homosexuals as a class or to curb the
perceived social harm of homosexuality itself. On the other hand, each of these
classifications, taken alone, is arguably narrower than Amendment 2. The state may
have other plausible interests in these particular classifications affecting
homosexuals, such as administrative or litigation costs, that do not arise from animus.

92. See id. at 640.

93. One commentator has called this heightened rationality review "rational basis with
bite." Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, RationalBasiswith Bite: IntermediateScrutinybyAny Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779 (1987).
94. See generally Kevin H. Lewis, Note, Equal Protection After Romer v. Evans:
Implicationsfor the Defense of MarriageAct and OtherLaws, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 175, 204-23

(1997) (arguing that Evans could be used to challenge the constitutionality of the federal antigay marriage law, state anti-gay adoption laws, and state anti-gay sodomy laws).
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II. CONSERVATIVE TRADITIONS

So is the sky falling on conservatives? Is Romer v. Evans a radical class revolution
favoring the knights and the templars against the common peasants, as Justice Scalia
thinks? Can the decision be justified on any conceivable conservative principles of
government or jurisprudence? To determine whether it can, we must review some
conservative intellectual history.
A. Incrementalismas a ConservativeMethod
A venerable principle of conservatism, rooted in the work of Edmund Burke, T.S.
Eliot, Russell Kirk, and many other conservative thinkers, is that we should respect
tradition and history. This strain of conservatism generallyprefers stability to change,
continuity to experiment, and the tried to the untried.
Burke was a British statesman and political philosopher who served in the House
of Commons before, during, and after the American Revolutionary War. His famous
attack on the excesses of the Jacobins in Reflections on the Revolution in Franceis
"the single most influential work of conservative thought published from his day to
ours." Burke's Reflections "called into being that which we have for two centuries
understood to be the Right."' Largely based on this single work, Burke is widely
considered the father of the traditionalist strain of modem conservatism. No single
person before or since has had a deeper impact on the contours of traditional
conservatism. As one political scientist put it, "[a]ll the analysts of conservatism..
. unite in identifying Edmund Burke as the conservative archetype and in assuming
that the basic elements of his thought are the basic elements of conservatism."97
Understanding Burke's philosophy, then, is key to understanding a Burkean
conservative's take on Amendment 2 and Evans. Three aspects of Burke's
thought-his faith in the possibility of slow progress, his willingness to depart from
an original design, and his defense of unpopular groups--are especially relevant.
1. Slow but Well-Sustained Progress
Burke has often been identified as a defender of existing practices and traditions
against innovation." There is much in Burke's writings and speeches to support this
view. "When ancient opinions and rules of life are taken away, the loss cannot

95. Jerry Z. Muller, Introduction to Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in
France,in CONSERVATISM: AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOCIAL AND POUTICALTHOUGHT FROMDAVID

HUME TO THE PRESENT 78, 78 (Jerry Z. Muller ed., 1997).
96. Mark C. Henrie, Edmund Burke and Contemporary American Conservatism, in
EDMUND BURKE: His LIFE AND LEGACY 198,202 (Ian Crowe ed., 1997).
97. Samuel P. Huntington, Conservatismas an Ideology, 51 AM. POL Sc. REV. 454,456

(1957).
98. Cass Sunstein, for example, argues that "the Due Process Clause is associated with the
protection of traditionally respected rights from novel or short-term change." Cass R. Sunstein,
Homosexuality andthe Constitution,70 IND. L.J. 1,
3 (1994). From this, he concludes that the
clause "is largely Burkean and backward-looking." Id.
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possibly be estimated," Burke wrote in Reflections." "From that moment we have no
compass to govern us." " Burke argued that aset of"just prejudices" in a people was
healthy for society."°'
[I]nstead of casting away all our old prejudices, we cherish them to a very
considerable degree, and, to take more shame to ourselves, we cherish them
because they are prejudices; and the longer they have lasted and the more
generally they have prevailed, the more we cherish them. We are afraid to put
men to live and trade each on his own private stock of reason, because we suspect
that this stock in each man is small, and that the individuals would do better to
avail themselves of the general bank and capital of nations and of ages.'02
Burke urged caution on all projects to reform society: "[lit is with infinite caution that
any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has answered in any
tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or on building it up again
without having models and patterns of approved utility before his eyes."' '
However, the common reading of Burke as simply a defender of tradition often
misses the richness and subtlety of his philosophy. He did not oppose all evolution
of a society's mores, traditions, and values. Rather, he counseled deliberation and
patience in reform.
This side of Burke's philosophy is clear even in Reflections, easily his most
prominent and full-throated defense of tradition. For Burke, the operation of change
should be "slow and in some cases almost imperceptible.""' He urged forbearance
and consensus building. 5 He defined a statesman as having "[a] disposition to
preserve and an ability to improve."'1 6 He believed deeply in the possibility of"a slow
but well-sustained progress."'0" In other words, Burke supported incremental change
rather than the convulsive social upheavals he saw in events like the French
Revolution.
2. The Inevitability of Change in the Original Design
Burke also saw that the original design of an institution would inevitably undergo
change. For example, he observed that the American colonies had created their own
assemblies that were originally nothing more than municipal corporations with no
legislative authority.0 8 Yet over time these assemblies had developed into lawmaking

99. EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 89 (Thomas H.D.
Mahoney ed., Bobbs-Merrill Educ. Publ'g 1981) (1790).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 99.
102. Id. at 98-99.
103. Id. at 70.
104. Id. at 197.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 181.
107. Id. at 198.
108. Letter from Edmund Burke to John Fair and John Harris, Esqrs. Sheriffs of the City of
Bristol on the Affairs ofAmerica(Apr. 3, 1777), in EDMUNDBURKE: SELECTED WRrrNGSAND
SPEECHES 186, 205 (Peter J. Stanlis ed., 1963) [hereinafter Letter to the Sheriffs].
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bodies with forms, functions, and powers similar to parliaments. Burke noted that
British critics of these assemblies claimed accurately that the assemblies had not been
intended, at their creation, for that broad purpose.' 9
Burke's response to this criticism is a challenge for anyone who thinks that
conservative political or legal theory consists of being strictly faithful to some
original design: "[N]othing in progression can rest on its original plan," wrote
Burke." 0 "We may as well think of rocking a grown man in the cradle of an infant.""I
To him, "it was natural" that the assemblies should grow in importance as the
colonies themselves grew and prospered."'
3. Defense of Unpopular Minorities
Further, to some extent Burke has been seen as an apologist for existing power
arrangements and privileges-even as an advocate for a return to feudalism. His
strong attack on the French Revolution and staunch defense of the French monarchy,
for example, have been seen as examples of a desire to bolster the powerful at the
expense of the downtrodden."' This view, it turns out, is even more suspect than the
notion that Burke was invariably a defender of the status quo.
Burke was quite willing to defend unpopular causes, people, and interests. For
example, as will be seen in greater detail shortly, Burke defended the American
colonists in their uprising against the British on the ground that the king and
Parliament had imposed unprecedented taxes on the Americans and trampled their
rights. Indeed, he so forcefully defended the colonists that he was virtually accused
of treason." 4 He was also critical of British rule in India for its oppression of
Hindus.' 'Although a staunch establishmentarian, he defended the rights ofreligious
minorities-especiallyIrish Catholics-against the power and prestige ofthe Church
of England." 6 He did not mince words criticizing Louis XIV's persecution of
Protestants, a minority in France."' He also strongly opposed slavery, resisted seating
American representatives inParliamentbecause theywould necessarilyhave included
slaveowners, and drafted a Negro Code that would have gradually granted freedom

to American slaves.""

109. Id.
I10. Id.
Ill. Id.
112. Id.
113. DON HERZOG, POISONING THE MINDS OF THE LOWER ORDERS 505-15 (1998).
114. Burke retorted: "I am charged with being an American. Ifwarmnaffection towards those
over whom I claim any share of authority be a crime, I am guilty of this charge." Letter to the
Sheriffs, supranote 108, at 198.
115. RUSSELL KIRK, TiE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BuRKE TO ELIoT 36 (1960).
116. See, e.g., Edmund Burke, Fragments of a Tract Relative to the Laws Against Popery
in Ireland (1765), in EDMUND BURKE: SELECTED WRrrINGS AND SPEECHES, supra note 108,
at 210, 210-27 [hereinafter Tract on Popery Laws].
117. Burke said that Louis XIV's revocation ofthe Edict ofNantes, which had granted some
measure of tolerance to the Huguenots, was an "act of injustice" that cast "a cloud over all the
splendor of a most illustrious reign." Id. at 217.
118. Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and
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Consider especially Burke's'sustained and controversial critique of Britain's war
against the American colonies. Burke believed that the crown infringed traditional
American liberties and, in the prosecution of the war, English liberty as well. In an
effort, for example, to intimidate the colonists, "we wholly abrogated the ancient
government of Massachusetts". 9 by removing the colony's governor, its public
council, judges, and executive magistrates. The purpose of these actions was to scare
Americans with the possibility of anarchy-life without British administration. But
after a year of this mistreatment Massachusetts had not dissolved into chaos.
From this, Burke drew a valuable lesson about the fallibility of human reliance on
supposed venerable beliefs and the need to reexamine those beliefs in the light of
experience. On March 22, 1775, he articulated this lesson in a famous speech to
Parliament:
Our late experience has taught us that many of those fundamental principles
formerly believed infallible are either not of the importance they were imagined
to be, or that we have not at all adverted to some other far more important and far
more powerful principles which entirely overrule those we had considered
omnipotent.'
This passage reveals two important components of Burke's philosophy of
conservatism. First, what we presently regard as "fundamental principles" are not
immune to critique and revision based on the lessons derived from experience.
Second, experience may reveal that our operating principles are subordinate to even
more fundamental principles that should overrule them. This is hardly a static
philosophy of governance. It is one that does not shy from drawing lessons from
experience that cause us to revise even our deepest notions of right and wrong.
Burke's words here have been called a "succinct formulation of the fundamental,
intrinsic dilemma of conservatism: When does experience demand a change in the
order of institutional priorities?"''
Burke learned another important lesson from his country's treatment of colonial
America. Britain's willingness to trample Americans' liberties, he believed, had hurt
the cause of British liberty. This was manifested in very practical ways. In an effort
to silence critics of the war, for example, Parliament passed a bill to partially suspend
the Habeas
' ' Corpus Act in Britain. Burke denounced this as an act of "deepfl

malignity.

)12

ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 N.C. L. REv. 619, 654 (1994).
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(Mar. 22, 1775), in EDMUND BURKE: SELECTED WRrrINGS AND SPEECHES, supra note 108, at
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But something even more important was being lost in the prosecution of the war:
it undermined the very principle of liberty itself.
For, inorder to prove that the Americans have no right to their liberties, we are
every day endeavoring to subvert the maxims which preserve the whole spirit of
our own. To prove that the Americans ought not to be free, we are obliged to
depreciate the value of freedom itself; and we never seem to gain a paltry

advantage over them in debate, without attacking some of those principles, or
deriding some of those feelings, for which our ancestors have shed their blood.
123

This is not the voice of an inveterate defender of the status quo, or a champion of
the interests of the powerful against the powerless. Rather, it is the voice of a thinker
who is sensitive to the serious damage that can be done to important principles when
a powerful force overwhelms and persecutes a disfavored group in the interest of
denying that the group even has a place in the polity.
Burke also had a remarkably tolerant attitude toward sodomy for a person of his
time and culture. He strongly defended the legal rights of men accused of engaging
in sodomy, a crime punishable by pillory, imprisonment, and, depending on the
circumstances, death in Burke's England. In 1774, for example, Burke publicly
intervened on behalf of a lieutenant of the Royal Artillery who had been sentenced
to death for sodomy." He argued that the evidence against the lieutenant was weak
and that his character was otherwise unblemished." As a result ofBurke's pleas, the
man was spared on condition that he leave Britain.'26

In the spring of 1780, during a time of national crisis, Burke "did not hesitate to
inflict upon the House of Commons an impassioned harangue on the subject of
sodomy."' 27 Although he condemned sodomy-as any person wishing to be taken
seriously in politics in his age would have had to do 28 -Burke zealously argued for
more leniency in the punishment of it. He especially abhorred the practice of placing
those convicted of sodomy in a public pillory. In Burke's time, several men punished29
in this way had been pelted to death by angry mobs before they could be released.
This, in particular, enraged Burke.
So passionately did he publicly defend men accused of sodomy that a "whispering
campaign" against Burke himself began, laying him open to the "grossest charges,"
including "reports that he was mentallyunstable," accordingto one biographer."rThe
press mercilessly attacked Burke's defense of sodomites, going so far as to question
I

never be tried according to justice." Id.
123. Speech on Conciliation, supranote 119, at 164.
124. STANLEY AYLNG, EDMUND BURKE: His LIFE AND OPINIONs 53-54 (1988).

125. Id.
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127. SIR PHILIP MAGNUS, EDMUND BURKE: A LIFE 55 (1939).

128. 1do not mean to suggest that Burke's stated opposition to sodomy was mere political
expedience. I only claim that if he did question the utility of sodomy laws he would have had
to keep that uncertainty quiet.
129. MAGNUS, supranote 127, at 148-50.
130. Id. at 55.
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his moral character and "accus[e] him of sympathy with homosexual practices."''
The insinuation that Burke himself might be a sodomite was clear. The press became
so vituperative on this point that Burke sued one publication for libel.'
In short, Burke "defended the liberties of Englishmen against their king, and the
liberties of Americans against king and parliament, and the liberties of Hindus against
Europeans."' On almost every great issue of his time, Burke sided with unpopular,
powerless groups against the designs of the overbearing and powerful. He defended
them precisely because their rights were based on larger principles rooted in the
historic rights secured by the unwritten British constitution. " Burke clearly saw that
present practices, no matter how popular or how ancient their origins, might have to
be abandoned in light of experience or to give way to higher principle.
4. T.S. Eliot and Russell Kirk
Conservatives since Burke have shared his passionate faith in the possibility of
incremental change and his willingness to defend unpopular groups.
Like Burke, T.S. Eliot, the English poet and literary critic who has been called "a
chief conservative thinker in our time,"13 distrusted change for the sake of change.
"Every change we make is tending to bring about a new civilisation of the nature of
which we are ignorant, and in which we should all of us be unhappy," he wrote in
Notes Toward the Definition of Culture.36
Yet Eliot acknowledged that society must not be static. It would have to make room
for new traditions and practices.
So of society we can only say: "We shall try to improve it in this respect or the
other, where excess or defect is evident; we must try at the same time to embrace
so much in our view, that we may avoid, in putting one thing right, putting
something else wrong."' 37
Eliot specifically warned against the danger of "petrifaction" in conservatism.'38
"Conservatism is too often conservation of the wrong things," he observed.'
Even in his advocacy ofan explicitly Christian-dominated society, Eliot recognized
the presence and value of dissenters to the governing moral heritage. "I cannot
foresee any future society in which we could classify Christians and non-Christians
simply by their professions of belief, or even, by any rigid code, by their behaviour,"
Eliot wrote in The Idea of a ChristianSociety. 4 "And perhaps there will always be

131. Id. at 148-50.
132. AYLNG, supra note 124, at 54.
133. RUSSELL KIRK, Thu CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BuRKE TO ELiOT 21 (1960).
134. Id. at 21-22.
135. Id. at 544.
136. T.S. ELIOT, CHiusTIANITY AND CULTURE: THE IDEA OF A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY AND
NOTES TOWARDS THE DEFINMON OF CULTURE 13 (1968).
137. Id. at 92.
138. Id. at 13.
139. KiRK,supra note 133, at 544 (quoting T.S. Eliot).
140. EUOT, supra note 136, at 34.
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individuals who, with great creative gifts of value to mankind, and the sensibility
which such gifts imply, will yet remain blind, indifferent, or even hostile [to the
dominant Christian culture]. That mustnot disqualify them from exercising the talents
they have been given."''"
Burke's leading modem American disciple, Russell Kirk-a prominent
conservative intellectual in his own right-took a similar approach to social change.
"Society must alter," Kirk wrote in his seminal work, The ConservativeMind, "for
slow change is the means of its conservation, like the human body's perpetual
renewal.. .."' In his reverent analysis of Burke, Kirk noted:
Does the observance of prejudice and prescription, then, condemn mankind to a
perpetual treading in the footsteps of their ancestors? Burke has no expectation
that men can be kept from social change, or that a rigid formalism is
Even ancientprejudices andprescriptionsmust sometimes shrink
desirable ....
beforethe advance ofpositiveknowledge.... The perceptive reformer combines
an ability to reform with a disposition to preserve; the man who loves change is
wholly disqualified, from his lust, to be the agent of change."'
Drawing perhaps on the lesson of Burke's brave stand in defense of the rights of
the American colonists and the Hindus, Kirk added: "Conservatism never is more
admirable than when it accepts changes that it disapproves, with good grace, for the
sake of a general conciliation .... "I"
Kirk, too, defended unpopular groups and causes against encroachments on
traditional rights. For example, he derided the military draft as "slavery" and was
critical of both big business and big labor. 4 He was also furious at the confinement
of Japanese Americans in internment camps shortly after Pearl Harbor."*
The source of Kirk's defense of these unpopular causes was his abiding belief in
a body of principles that must, in his view, override current practices or prejudices.
Kirk identified strongly with Burke's willingness to protect, "above all, a body of
principles,a tradition of thought that transcended the 'epiphenomena' of eighteenthcentury England."' 47 He believed,' as did Burke, that a conservative could "be both a
traditionalist and a rational man."'
None of this has stopped conservatives from opposing political trends that,
although bold in their time, now enjoy broad mainstream support. Conservatism's
most regrettable moments in recent years have come when conservatives failed to
recognize the need to change present practices in light of experience or in the interest
of some higher principle, like America's traditions of equality and individual liberty.
For example, at the height of the African-American civil rights struggle, many
conservatives defended segregation in the South. Some even argued against suffrage
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rights for African-Americans 4 9 Many opposed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 on
grounds that suggested a lingering racism." Others defended the excesses of
McCarthyism' and opposed equal rights for women.
Still, the most enduring conservative voices-in the mold of Burke, Eliot, and
Kirk-have taught reverence for tradition while warning against slavish adherence

to a lost or outmoded past. "There cannot be a return to the Middle Ages or the Old
South under slogans identified with them,"'s2 wrote University of Chicago Professor
Richard Weaver, a conservative fan of southern agrarian culture. "The principles
must be studied and used, but in such presentation that mankind will feel the march
is forward.""' 3 Thus, the popular image of the conservative as the person who stands

"athwart history yelling 'Stop!"' 5 4needs to be amended. Rather, the dominant strain
of conservatism has stood athwart history yelling, "Slow down!"
B. Recovering a Conservative Tradition:
The Meaning of PoliticalEquality

So far, I have presented the conservative view of the pace at which political and
legal change should occur. I have also discussed the conservative theory by which
longstanding principles should be revised or abandoned in favor of new
understandings based on experience or higher principles. It remains to be seen what
direction, for a conservative, that change should move. That, in turn, requires a
substantive conservative idea of what the Constitution is meant to achieve and what
problems it is meant to forestall. That is the subject of the next two sections, which
address conservatives' understanding ofpolitical equality and the Framers' concerns

about faction-driven, nondeliberative decisionmaking.
Burke, as usual, is a fountainhead for conservative philosophy in the area of
political equality under the law. As will be seen, the parallels between Burke's views,
on the one hand, and those of James Madison and the sponsors of the Fourteenth
Amendment, on the other, are sometimes striking. For a person seeking insight into
the meaning and importance of political equality to a traditionalist conservative, an

understanding of Burke's views is indispensable.
Inveighing against Parliament's decision to suspend habeas corpus only for those
who had traveled abroad during a specified time, Burke stressed the'importance of

149. Id. at 200.
150. Id. at 277. There is, ofcourse, a powerful libertarian and nonracist argument to be made
against laws prohibiting discrimination in private employment. See generally RICHARD A.
EPsTEIN, TAKINGs: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
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of the U.S. Army. The hearings convinced even many fervently anticommunist conservatives
that McCarthy had gone too far. He was censured by the Senate later that year and his political
career never recovered.
152. RICHARD M. WEAVER, THE SOUTHERN TRADITIONAT BAY: A HIsToRYOFPOSTBELLUM
THOUGHT 394-95 (George Core & M.E. Bradford eds., 1968).
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equal application of the law.
For the first time a distinction is made among the people in this realm. Before this
act, every man putting his foot on English ground, every stranger owing only a
local and temporary allegiance, even negro slaves who had been sold in the
colonies and under an act of Parliament, became as free as every other man who
breathed the same air with them. Now a line is drawn, which may be advanced
further and further at pleasure ....
1s
This passage shows Burke's insight that, although society might recognize classes of
people (temporary visitors and slaves, for example), the law had to treat those classes
the same "as every other man who breathed the same air with them."' 56 Burke was
also concerned about the precedent such a law would set. He worried that partial
erosion of the principle of equality in the law might lead to further erosion.
But Burke's concern about the partial suspension of habeas corpus went even
further than that. To him, it struck at the very idea of a political community: "There
is no equality among us; we are not fellow-citizens, if the mariner who lands on the
quay does not rest on as firm legal ground as the merchant who sits in the countinghouse. Other laws may injure the community; this dissolves it."'"
This is surely one of the most striking passages in all of Burke's writing on law.
For Burke, equal application of the law was not only right, and not only prudent, but
it made the political communitypossible.Where other intrusions on tradition might
harm the polity; intrusion on the equality principle threatened to destroy it.
In Burke's view, the security of liberty rested in the general applicability of the
laws. As we shall see, he believed that if a majority could fence out a particular
group, there was no protection for liberty, for liberty's final refuge was in the
requirement that what the majority inflicted on others it had also to inflict upon itself.
Legal equality, then, was a safeguard of all other liberty. This emphasis on equality
highlights a powerful, ifrarely invoked, aspect oftraditionalist conservative thought.
It sees equality as the necessary support for all else in the legal regime.
Conservative legal scholars have, of course, long been critical ofjudicial activism
thought to serve the interests of political liberalism. 58 Many have been particularly
critical of the U.S. Supreme Court since its 1954 decision to outlaw segregation in
Brown v. Board ofEducation.'59 These conservative criticisms have focused on the
need to base judicial decisionmaking in the Constitution's text and history, in
accordance with the understanding of the Framers.
Nevertheless, even as conservatives have been critical of the Court's perceived
activism, they have recognized a role for the judiciary in squaring tradition and
original principle with subsequent experience. Robert Bork, for example, believes the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought legal segregation was consistent with
the amendment they adopted."6 Yet he defends the result in Brown, which held that

155. Letter to the Sheriffs, supra note 108, at 192.
156. Id.
157. Id. (emphasis added).
158. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 13, at 17.
159. NASH, supra note 145, at 215-16.
160. BOP.K, supra note 13, at 82. Whether it is true that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought segregation was constitutionally acceptable is anothermatter. Michael W.
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segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment, because "[b]y 1954, when Brown
came up for decision, it had been apparent for some time that segregation rarely if
ever produced equality."' 6' The constitutional text had not changed, the basic
principle of equality adopted in 1868 had not changed (at least as it was written into
the Constitution), no transformative history of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment had been unearthed, yet Bork agrees that the principle of equality the
Fourteenth Amendment's authors adopted could trump their specific intentions
(supporting segregation).6 How so? The reason, for Bork, is that experience since
the adoption, including the advance of positive knowledge about the effects of
segregation, had demonstrated that equality couldnot coexist with segregation.'" One
had to give way. "The purpose that brought the [F] ourteenth [A]mendment into being
was equality before the law, and equality, not separation, was written into the text,"
he concludes.'
C. The Madisonian Tradition and the Danger of the Majority Faction
The countermajoritarian critique ofpolitical inequalityhas roots in the views of the
of the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee
Framers, as well as in the text and history
' 65
of the "equal protection of the laws.'
In The Federalist,James Madison warned against measures that limit a group's
ability to bring about change through ordinary political processes. " Madison worried
about the development of"factions" animated by hostility. 67 Consider his comments
in The FederalistNo. 10:
By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whetheramounting to a majority
or a minority ofthe whole, who are united or actuated by some common impulse
of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.'6
The Constitution was intended to correct an intolerable situation that had arisen
under the Articles of Confederation, Madison contended. "[M]easures are too often
decided, not according to the rules ofjustice and the rights of the minor party, but by
the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority."'' 6 He continued: "To
secure the public good and private rights against... such a [majority] faction, and at
the same time to preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then the

McConnell, OriginalismandtheDesegregationDecisions,81 VA. L. REV. 947,953-54 (1995)
(arguing that the actions of the Reconstruction Congress contradict the consensus view that the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment supported segregation).
161. BoRK, supra note 13, at 82.
162. Id. at 81-82.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
166. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 161-62 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed.
1966).
167. THEFEDERAUSTNO. 10, at 16-20 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2d ed. 1966).
168. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
169. Id. at 16.
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great object to which our inquiries are directed."' 70 The object of the Constitution
was, in Madison's view, to render the majority "unable to concert and carry into
effect schemes of oppression."''
Madison distrusted direct democracy--of which Colorado's referendum adopting
Amendment 2 is an instance-because it offered no hope of tempering the passions
of a majority aroused against the interests or rights of a minority. "Hence it is that
such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever
been found incompatible with personal security or the rights of property; and have in
general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths."'
Madison was particularly wary of pure democracy at the smaller and lower level
ofstate orlocal government. Decidingpolicymatters affectingthe rights ofminorities
at the national level, on the other hand, makes it
less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade
the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and to act in unison with
each other.'73
Madison trusted that the sheer size ofthe new republic would hinder the development
of oppressive factions.
Burke, writing roughly contemporaneously with the Framers, also warned of the
dangers ofmajoritarian power in a democracy. "Ofthis I am certain," he wrote, "that
in a democracy the majority of the citizens is capable of exercising the most cruel
oppressions upon the minority whenever strong divisions prevail in that kind of
polity, as they often must.. .,."" Minorities so targeted by a majority "are deprived
of all external consolation," he observed.' "They seem deserted by mankind,
overpowered by a conspiracy of their whole species."' 76
Like Madison, Burke believed that representative government was not merely the
exercise of raw power. It was also not simply the expression of popular will. Rather,
he saw representative government as a matter requiring the interaction of the popular
will and the legislators' own independent judgment. As he explained to his Bristol
constituents in his acceptance speech upon election to Parliament in October 1774:
"If government were a matter of will upon any side, yours, without question, ought
to be superior. But government and legislationare matters of reason andjudgment,
and not of inclination .... "'
Further, Burke posited the existence of a general welfare upon which
representatives had a duty to act. He therefore shared Madison's disdain for faction-

170. Id. at 19-20.
171. Id. at 20.
172. Id.; see also Jack N. Rakove, The Super-Legality ofthe Constitution, or, a Federalist
Critique of Bruce Ackerman's Neo-Federalism, 108 YALE L.J. 1931, 1954-56 (1999)
(discussing the difficulties of ratifying the Constitution).
173. THE FEDERALST No. 10, supra note 167, at 22.
174. BURKE, supranote 99, at 143-44.
175. Id. at 144.
176. Id.
177. Letter to the Sheriffs, supra note 108, at 187 (emphasis added).
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dominated politics.'78 In his acceptance speech, Burke characterized his vision of the
deliberative role of government in a fashion that Madison would have understood and
approved:
Parliament is not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile interests,
which interests each must maintain, as an agent and advocate, against other
agents and advocates; but Parliamentis a deliberativeassembly of one nation,
with one interest, that of the whole-where not local purposes, not local
prejudices, ought to guide, but the general good, resulting from the general reason
of the whole." 9
By the middle of the nineteenth century it was clear that the original constitutional
design had failed to prevent the majority from effecting "schemes of oppression"
againstminorities, especially the enslaved African-American population inthe South.
The Civil War, and the constitutional amendments that followed it, arose partly from
a desire to correct this abuse of power.
Addressing the concerns of Madison and others about the abuse of power by
aroused majorities, the Fourteenth Amendment explicitly forbids states to "deny to
anyperson.. . the equal protection of the laws."' 8 ° In a proposed joint resolution for
the Fourteenth Amendment, Charles Sumner argued that the amendment would
abolish "oligarchy, aristocracy, caste, or monopoly" with particular privileges and
powers."' Senator Howard (R-Mich.), floor manager of the Fourteenth Amendment,
argued that it would "abolish all class legislation... and [do] away with the injustice
of subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another. ' ' "
Even conservative legal defenders of Amendment 2 have acknowledged that part
of our constitutional tradition is a bar against state actions based on a "bare... desire
to harm a politically unpopular group,"'8 "unreasoned antipathy,"' "mere negative
attitudes," and "unsubstantiated 'fear' toward a class of people."'8 5 They simply deny
that Amendment 2 fits in any of those categories.
Political equality, then, is our inheritance. It is part of the nation's tradition, rooted
deeply in its history, in its legal texts, and thus necessarily in the heart of any Burkean

178. Madison and Burke would likely have disagreed on how to discourage unreasoned
factionalism. Burke was an early advocate of political parties, which Madison distrusted. For
his part, Burke would have been dubious of Madison's mechanistic system of checks and
balances. I am indebted to Ernest Young for pointing out these differences.
179. Letter to the Sheriffs, supra note 108, at 187 (emphasis added).
180. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
181. J.M. Balkin, The ConstitutionofStatus, 106 YALEL.J. 2313, 2348 (1997) (quoting the
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 674 (1866)).
182. Id. (quoting the CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866)). For a more
complete discussion of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment, see ANDREW KULL, THE
COLOR-BUiND CONSTITUION 74-75 (1992).

183. United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534-35 (1973) (Brennan, J.),
quoted in Dailey & Farley, supra note 5, at 229-30.
184. Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 708 (1994) (Wald, J., dissenting), quotedin Dailey &
Farley, supra note 5, at 229-30.
185. City of Clebume v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432,448 (1985) (White, J.),
quoted in Dailey & Farley, supra note 5, at 229-30.
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conservative living in America.
Ill. EVANs's CONSERVATISM

Evans is a product of America's constitutional tradition-both in substance and in
its incremental method-and is thus consistent with mainstream conservative thought.
This can be seen in three ways.
First, although conservatives defend tradition, there is always an initial question
that must be answered: what tradition is to be defended? In Evans as in other legal
decisions and political controversies affecting gays, competing traditions vie for
conservatives' loyalty. The higher tradition should be chosen by the Burkean
conservative. I argue that the higher tradition at stake in Evans favors the outcome
reached by the Court. Second, conservatives have embraced political equality against
majoritarian decisionmaking. Although some forms ofdiscrimination are permissible
for a conservative, the most extreme and unprecedented forms-those that politically
fence out a particular group-are not. Evans fits squarely within this conservative
tradition. Finally, Evans addresses Madison's nightmare-a faction comprising the
majority of voters aroused against the rights and interests of a minority-and
vindicates the principle of "equal protection" enshrined in the language and history
of the Constitution. Thus, Evans is defensible as an originalist and textual matter.
A. Competing Traditions:Evans and the HigherPrinciple
In its defense of tradition, conservatism is often confronted with a dilemma: What
tradition must be defended? In the case of Amendment 2, as in other contexts, two
competing traditions seem in direct conflict.
On the one hand, America has an undeniable tradition of defending conventional
sexual morality against claims by gays, and others, for equality. Part of that defense
has been to allow legislatures the power to regulate sexuality for moral ends. This
tradition includes a history of sodomylaws, bans on same-sex marriage, prohibitions
on military service by gays, and a host of other legal disabilities placed on
homosexuals. Disapproval of gay sex has been widespread and is shared by most
major Western religions to some degree. Chief Justice Burger, voting to uphold
Georgia's sodomy law in Hardwick, noted: "To hold that the act of homosexual
sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia
of moral teaching."'8 6 Justice Scalia, in his Evans dissent, invoked the desire of
Coloradans to protect traditional sexual mores against the advances made by
advocates of gay equality.'87 Amendment 2 might appear to be well within this
tradition.
186. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (Burger, J., concurring). At least as applied
to oral sodomy, Burger's and the Court's legal history is arguably wrong. Although every state
had "sodomy" laws (variously appearing as laws against "buggery" and "crimes against
nature") at the time of the adoption ofthe Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, these laws were not
explicitly understood to prohibit oral sex. ESKRDGE, supra note 73, at 157-61. In 1879,
Pennsylvania became the first American jurisdiction to define "sodomy and buggery" as
including oral sex. Id. at 158.
187. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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On the other hand, America has a traditional commitment to protecting political
equality against encroachments by aroused and impassioned majorities.
Conservatives, too, have adopted this commitment. It is now unquestioned in
conservative circles, for example, that the state cannot segregate the races or prohibit
women from practicing law. Yet these were controversial propositions in their time,
presenting conservatives with a choice between defending existing practices and
defending the tradition of equality.
This equality tradition does not mean that everyone must be treated the same.
Felons, for example, are an unpopular group who are justifiably not treated just like
everyone else for all purposes. But the equality tradition does mean at least three
things. First, the state must have non-animus-based reasons to support its measures
against the group.' The broader the disability the less trustworthy the state's asserted
purpose. Second, reasons once thought to express a permissible moral judgment may,
by the advance of positive knowledge about the group, be recast as impermissible
animus. Third, for Burkean conservatives, measures that broadly fence out a
particular group politically present a threat to the very idea ofpolitical community. 89
In the'case of felons, the state has ample justifications aside from simple spite to
take measures that disadvantage the group. The advance ofpositive knowledge about
felons has not exposed moral disapprobation of them as mere animus. Finally,
discrimination against felons does not undermine the basis for political community;
such discrimination defends the community from actions by felons that would
undermine it (through violence and theft, for example).
Under this conception ofpolitical equality, broad discrimination against gays ofthe
type present inAmendment 2 is suspect The very breadth ofAmendment 2 suggests
animus. The advance of positive knowledge about gays-recognized even by
prominent conservatives 9 ' -has opened the veil of morality that once covered such
discrimination, exposing the empirical weakness of many claims about the harms
caused by homosexuals. Finally, although some discrimination against gays surely
does not threaten to dissolve the political community, for a Burkean conservative
drastic measures to isolate them politically do.
So we have one tradition defending conventional sexual morality of which
Amendment 2 might be an instance. 9 ' We have a competing tradition defending
political equality that Amendment 2 defies. Which tradition-the tradition of
conventional sexual morality or the tradition ofpolitical equality-should prevail for
a conservative?
To answer this question as a general matter, we may return to Burke. When faced
with competing traditions, conservatives should defend the higher tradition against
the particular practices of the time. Conservatives should do so even if defending the
higher tradition means defending an unpopular group, as Burke himself defended the

188. Even the conservative critics of Evans agree with this point. Dailey & Farley, supra
note 5, at 266.
189. See supra Part II.A.3.
190. See infra text accompanying notes 216-28.
191. Shortly, I explain in further detail why Amendment 2 "might be"-rather than clearly
"is"---part of a tradition of defending conventional sexual morality: Amendment 2 is so
extreme that it is outside the confines of the tradition of defending conventional sexual
morality.
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American colonists, the Hindus, religious minorities, black slaves, and even men
convicted of sodomy." At such times when it defends that which it disapproves,
observed Russell Kirk, conservatism is most admirable. 93 Kirk noted that "[e]ven
ancient prejudices ... must sometimes shrink before the advance of positive
knowledge."''
Kirk specifically praised Burke for defending "a body of
principles ... that transcended the epiphenomena" of his time." 5 In the battle
between Amendment 2 and the tradition of political equality, Amendment 2 seems
more likely to count as an epiphenomenon of our time, and political equality is the
better candidate for higher-principle status. This is so for several reasons.
First, even as a defense of conventional sexual morality, Amendment 2 goes farther
than other such laws have gone by denying homosexuals legal protections in a
sweeping manner. The premise that homosexual behavior is a vice-the assumption
of conventional sexual morality-does not lead by itself to any particular policy
conclusion. One could believe that anal sex is morally wrong, for example, but not
want the state to criminalize it. The homosexuality-as-vice premise certainly does not
lead necessarily to the historical oddity that was Amendment 2, which was the
first-and only-such law to pass in any state in the union. 96 Its claims to a
traditional pedigree are therefore questionable. Its very novelty should engender
conservative skepticism. Even as an expression of traditional sentiment about
conventional sexual morality, a tradition that is hardly monolithic or unchanging,
Amendment 2 was an outlier. It was a kind of sodomites-in-the-pillory overkill that
should alarm a Burkean conservative.' 97
Consider Justice Kennedy's concern that Amendment 2 was "unprecedented" (that
is, unsupported by tradition) in American law. "I've never seen a case like this," he
said at oral argument.' 8 "Here, the classification is adopted to fence out.., the class
for all purposes, and I've never seen a statute like that.""' Justice Ginsburg doubted
that "in all of U.S. history there has been any legislation like this that earmarks a
group and says, you will not be able to appeal to your State legislature to improve
your status" or that "thou shalt not have access to the ordinary legislative process for
anything that will improve the condition of this particular group."'
Justice Kennedy's opinion also contains statements rooted in the conservative
disposition to distrust the untried and untested. The opinion noted that Amendment 2
was unprecedented. Justice Kennedy remarked that its very unusual character made

192. See supra Part II.A.3.
193. KIRK, supra note 133, at 52.
194. Id. at 51.
195. Id. at 165.
196. Other laws preserving traditional morality have focused on specific areas of social
policy (e.g., sodomy, marriage, and the military).
197. Consider here Burke's concern for the safety and rights of sodomites placed in the
public pillory. See text accompanying notes 127-29.
198. Transcript ofOral Argument at4, Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (No. 94-1039).
199. Id. at 5.
200. Id. at 8. These claims by Justices Kennedy and Ginsburg may have been a rhetorical
exaggeration. Certainly there is precedent in American law for broadly fencing out an entire
group of people from ordinary political processes. Slavery comes to mind. But that is not the
kind of precedent a modem conservative would want to lean upon to defend Amendment 2.
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it constitutionally suspect.2"' He concluded, in a distinctly conservative voice: "It is

not within our constitutional traditionto enact laws of this sort.""2 2 This evident
concern with American history and tradition reveals a healthy conservative instinct
that distrusts innovation.
At first, Justice Kennedy's characterization of Amendment 2 as novel might seem
unfair or, as one scholar put it, "a bit odd."20 3 Amendment 2 was a reaction to a set
of developments--the adoption and passage of gay civil rights protections-that are
themselves new to the American scene. Thus, on this view, Amendment 2 might be
thought of as "restoring the traditional status quo ante by undoing those [gay-civilrights] laws." 2
Yet Amendment 2 did considerablymore than restore the status-quo-ante gay-civilrights laws in Colorado. After Amendment 2, the political and legal landscape for gay
Coloradans was more hazardous than before passage of local ordinances protecting
them from discrimination. Amendment 2 did not simply repeal those ordinances, after
all; it forbade their future passage. And a state constitutional amendment meant that,
to obtain legislative relief, they could no longer go to their local governing bodies or
even to their state legislature, as they could before the civil rights protections were
passed. They had to appeal to the entire state. No law had previously classified
citizens in that way. The far more modest-and conservative-idea of restoring the
status quo ante would have meant simply repealing antidiscrimination protections in
the locales in which they had been enacted, with every opportunity to reinstate them
locally at a later date. Amendment 2 did not simply turn back the clock; it invented
a new time zone and put gays in it.
Second, even if Amendment 2 could be thought to fit within the conventionalsexuality tradition in American law, the principle of political equality should trump
it. Unlike the conventional-sexuality tradition, the tradition of equality is written into
the nation's founding document itself. A commitment to equality in the face of
traditions of discrimination and popular hostility against classes of citizens is a
hallmark of the Fourteenth Amendment. For example, it has been used to overcome
longstanding traditions of racism and sexism reflected in law.
Further, conservatives have recognized that society should be wary of creating
castes out of the various disapproved groups that comprise it.2" 5 Eliot, for example,
recognized that a Christian society must not create castes of people who
fundamentally disagree with the governing moral tradition. Christians and nonChristians should not be "classified" according to belief or even according to a rigid
code of behavior, he advised. 2" Instead, these dissenters must be allowed to

201. Evans, 517 U.S. at 633 (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32,
37-38 (1928)).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. CAss R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TiME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 154 (1999).
204. Id.
205. Conservatives are not the only ones to recognize that the law should not create castes.
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle,92 MICH. L. REv.2410,2433 n.74 (1994) (applying
principle to protect groups with visible characteristics, like race or sex, but not to gays); Farber
& Sherry, supra note 57, at 265-70.
206. ELIoT, supra note 136, at 34.
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participate and to contribute their talents. 7 By singling out homosexuals as a class,
Amendment 2 denominated them as a separate caste ofmoral dissenters unworthy of
legal protection.
Finally, conservatives acknowledge that a traditional practice or body of thought
can evolve over time, aided by the advance of positive knowledge. 0° Conservatism
cannotbe allowed to putrefy and neither can society. The process ofreevaluation and
testing of existing practices is essential to Burkean conservatism, which values those
practices because they have been tested and have withstood the test of time. Recall
that Burke believed in "a slow but well-sustained progress."2' Kirk thought that
accommodating slow change, even on matters backed by ancient practice and belief,
was a matter of self-preservation." 0 To forestall the testing process is to cut the
experiential legs out fromunderBurkean conservatism. "To use coercion to maintain
the moral status quo at any point in a society's history," observed H.L.A. Hart in a
discussion of Burke, "would be artificially to arrest the process which gives social
institutions their value."2 1
A slow process of evolution in attitudes appears to be happening right now with
respect to gays. A majority of Americans now supports equal rights for gays in
housing, employment, and the military.212 Overall disapproval of homosexuality
dropped by nearly twenty percentage points in the space often years, from seventyfive percent to fifty-six percent."3 Fewer than half the states now have laws
prohibiting sodomy, and only a handful of those aim exclusively at gay sex.2" 4 The
few prohibitory laws that remain are enforced only sporadically-and almost never
against individuals having sex in the privacy of a home." 5
Conservatives, too, have recognized that traditional attitudes toward homosexuality
are retreating in the face of positive knowledge about it. As long ago as 1963, Ernest
van den Haag, a prolific conservative writer on law and culture, argued against the

207. Id. at 34-35.
208. See supra Part II.A. 1.
209. BURKE, supra note 99, at 198.
210. KIRK, supra note 133, at 8.
211. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORA=TY 75 (1963) (emphasis in original).
212. Carey Goldberg, Tolerancefor Gays Up, Study Says, Hous. CHRON., May 31, 1998,
at A4, LEXIS, News Library, HCHRN File.
213. Id.
214. ESKRIDGE, supra note 73, at app. Al (listing state statutes).
215. An exception to this is the arrest in 1998 of two men having sex in a private residence
in Houston. Because Texas is one ofthe few states with a sodomy law aimed exclusively at gay
sex, TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06 (Vernon 1994), the men are now appealing their
convictions, in part, on the grounds that the law violates the Equal Protection Clause. Lawrence
v. Texas, Nos. 14-99-00109-CR, 14-99-0011 1-CR, 2000 WL 729417, at *1(Tex. Crim. App.
June 8, 2000). Two of three Republican judges on an intermediate appeals court in Houston
recently held the state sodomy law unconstitutional under the state's equal rights amendment
forbidding sex discrimination. Id. The state is appealing the decision to the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals, the highest court in the state handling criminal matters. If it should
eventually reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the case appears to present the most compelling
circumstances for a reexamination of Hardwickin years; therefore, it may eventually test the
theory that Evans overruled Hardwick sub silentio. Whatever the outcome, the rarity of the
Houston case proves the rule of nonenforcement.
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notion that homosexuality is a sickness, denied that its suppression could be justified
by religious objections or natural law, and favored the legalization of homosexual
2 16

acts.

Van den Haag saw that the advance of positive knowledge about homosexuality
was undermining traditional arguments against it. This positive knowledge includes,
among other things, the realization that homosexuality is not a disease or a
'
"sickness,"217
is not addictive," is not infectious,2t 9 is not created by imitation or
°
habituation,' is not associated with a particular personality type,21 and cannot be
suppressed by legal restriction.' Moreover, homosexuals are no more likely to force
themselves on unwilling partners through "theft, swindle, or rape" than are
heterosexuals.m In the face ofthis growing knowledge, van den Haag did not see any
useful purpose served by laws that suppress homosexuality.2'
Van den Haag argued that "[t]he American ethos no more demands restrictions on
homosexuality than does the French or Italian ethos," where gay sex is not prohibited
bylaw.' In a passage striking for its similarity to Burke's recognition that even longstanding practices and beliefs might require revision and even discarding, van den
Haag concluded: "A hundred years ago one may have considered this restriction of
[homo]sexual conduct of practical value. It is not today: such prohibition is not
effective, and the values to be protected are no longer essential to the ethos as they
once were. ' ' 6 At the time van den Haag wrote those words, only one state, Illinois,
had decriminalized sodomy. 27 Since then, decriminalization has become the majority
nile.
Like van den Haag, Judge Richard Posner has underscored the invalidity of
numerous empirical claims made about homosexuality, including claims that it is a
sickness, that it is chosen or changeable, and that its incidence varies with the degree
of tolerance or repression in a legal regime.'

216. Ernest van den Haag, Notes on Homosexuality and Its Cultural Setting, in THE
PROBLEM OF HOMOSEXUALITY INMODERN SocIETY 291 (Hendrik M. Ruitenback ed., 1963).
217. Id. at 297. Van den Haag was joined in this view by the American Psychological
Association in 1973 when it removed homosexual orientation from the list of disorders in the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual. WIUAMN. ESKRrJGE, JR. &NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALrrY,
GENDER, AND THE LAW 185-86 (1997). Van den Haag, who was a practicing psychoanalyst in
1963, recalled an exchange with a colleague who insisted that "all my homosexual patients are
quite sick." Van den Haag, supra note 216, at 297. Van den Haag memorably replied, "[So
are all my heterosexual patients." Id.
218. Van den Haag, supra note 216, at 296.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 300.
223. Id. at 295.
224. Id. at 291.
225. Id. at 300.
226. Id.
227. Van den Haag himself noted: "One may observe whether this leads to undesirable
effects there. I do not believe so." Id. at 302 n.6.
228. POSNER, supra note 72, at 297-307. Posner, who has criticized Burkeanism in law as
"a mood rather than a method of analysis," would deny that he is a Burkean conservative.
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A conservative devoted to Constitutional originalism should not be oblivious to
changes in society's understanding of, and knowledge about, social phenomena.
Robert Bork recognizes the role played by the advance of positive knowledge in
9
adjusting constitutional principle to changed circumstances. Recall that Bork has
defended the result in Brown v. BoardofEducationu°even though he believed it was
inconsistent with the specific views ofthe framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, on
the grounds that experience had shown segregation was inconsistent with the equality
principle they had written into the Constitution."
Applying that method to the clash between a tradition defending conventional
sexual morality and a tradition ofpolitical equality yields two important lessons. First,
experience has shown that manyjustifications once offered for treating homosexuals
as a class differently are baseless. As in Brown, choosing either route (defending
conventional sexual morality or upholding political equality) "would violate one
'2
aspect of the original understanding, but there [is] no possibility of avoiding that.
Second, it is the equality principle, not conventional sexual morality, that is written
into the Constitution. Therefore, in a clash between the two principles the one with
textual roots--equality-should prevail. Recall that both these methods-revising
longstanding beliefs in light of experience and resorting to a higher principle to trump
a lower one-are Burkean. 3
Thus, even to the extent that Amendment 2 can be said to represent a tradition
defending conventional sexual morality against the claims of gay-equality advocates,
that tradition is in flux, has lost its empirical support, and is rapidly losing cultural
ground-even among conservatives. Though some conservatives may feel a lingering
queasiness about homosexuality, the time approaches when they would be welladvised to follow Kirk's advice to accept the changing mores "with good grace, for
the sake of a general conciliation. '' 4
Evans itself follows the conservative model for slow change."s Nothing in Evans
6
works a radical, sudden, and therefore unconservative change in the law. The

RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 443 (1990).

However, in his

pragmatism and demand for attention to the lessons of actual experience rather than theoretical
abstraction, Posner certainly shares the Burkean "mood." See id.
229. See BORK, supra note 13, at 82.
230. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
231. BORK, supra note 13, at 82.
232. Id. I do not suggest Bork himself would agree with the result in Evans or with the more
general point I am making about the constitutional consequences of the advance of positive
knowledge about gays.
233. See supra Part II.A.3.
234. KIRK, supra note 133, at 52.
235. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 203, at 137-71 (defending the result in Evans as a
minimalist one allowing for future judicial expansion).
236. This process ofslow legal change-in addition to satisfying the conservative penchant
for incrementalism-may also serve the long-term interests of gay civil rights causes. Kevin
H. Lewis, Equal ProtectionAfter Romer v. Evans: Implicationsfor the Defense ofMarriage
Act and OtherLaws,49 HASTINGS L.J. 175,222 (arguing that "incremental reform.., is more
palatable to the public and is probably more likely to achieve the advocates' ultimate goal of

invalidating bans on same-sex marriage").
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opinion did not explicitly decide the level of scrutiny applicable to laws classifying
gays. 7 It did not ban all governmental discrimination against gays." It did not
overrule Hardwick.39 It did not declare unconstitutional laws against same-sex
marriage.24 It did not overturn the ban on gay military service or the host of other
" ' The Court did not take the opportunity
legal disabilities applied to homosexuals. 24
to announce a new regime of full legal equality for gays." 2 It struck down only the
most extreme and sweeping of laws targeting gays. In short, it left intact much of the
anti-gay landscape that preceded it. Of course, the end of some anti-gay
epiphenomena may come in future applications of Evans but the Court made no
attempt to sweep them aside immediately.
Evans, then, can be supported on conservative grounds as the limited defense of a
higher principle-political equality-against a questionable expression of a dying
tradition that conceives homosexuality as a threat to sexual morality. As such, the
opinion preserves tradition even as it overrules the epiphenomenon that was
Amendment 2.
B. Evans and the Conservative Constitution
ofPoliticalEquality

The Equal Protection Clause embodies a constitutional principle that operates as
a critique of existing and past practices and traditions.243 It was designed, at a
minimum, to overturn a regime of racism that had been expressed most vividly in the
institution of slavery. It has since been read to challenge traditions of inequality for
women, aliens, and others. Therefore, it establishes a constitutional norm that, across
a broad spectrum of social issues, undermines the status quo and even longstanding
practices. In that sense, at first blush, it could be viewed as the ultimate rebuke to
conservatism.
Is the Equal Protection Clause unconservative? Rather than seeing the equality
principle as standing outside American tradition looking in, we could see it as inside
that tradition commenting on what it finds there. Conservatism in America, after all,
is a philosophy that accounts for and respects America's own particular heritage.
The political equality principle is an undeniable, venerable, and deeply rooted

237. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-35 (1986).
238. Id.
239. Id. The dissent criticized the majority for not even mentioning Hardwick. Id. at 640
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
240. Id. It would be an understatement to say that such a sweeping ruling would provoke a
fierce reaction from the public, the courts, and the state and federal legislatures, likely
provoking a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriages. Sunstein, supra note 98, at
25-27 (1994) (arguing that a sudden constitutional affirmation of same-sex marriage would lead
to a constitutional crisis). Richard Posner has made a similar objection, on pragmatic grounds,
to such adecision, "Were the Court to recognize the right to same-sex marriage today, it would
be taking on almost the whole nation." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL
AND LEGAL THEORY 251 (1999).
241. Evans, 517 U.S. at 631-35.

242. Id.
243. Sunstein, supra note 98, at 3.
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aspect of that heritage. The Equal Protection Clause itself and the other post-Civil
War Amendments date back more than 130 years. Before that, the nation's most
important statesmen, thinkers, and founders eloquently defended the principle of
political equality even if they were not always willing to follow it in practice.
What we have, by constitutional design, is tradition at war with tradition. This is
not as paradoxical as it might seem at first blush. To begin, there is no necessary
conflict between a Due Process Clause that protects historic rights from innovation,
on the one hand, and an Equal Protection Clause that ensures that those rights are
spread around equally, on the other. There will, of course, be tension between the
equalityprinciple (as even conservatives understand it) and some particularpractices.
However, to the extent conservatives see the equalityprinciple as sustaining the entire
constitutional enterprise through periods of change-by, for example, shoring up the
liberty of all and making the political community possible-this tension is healthy.
It ultimately preserves the whole design in times of instability.
Thus, America's constitutional tradition incorporates a principle-equality under
the law-that itself operates as a critique of some traditional practices. It embodies
a constitutional dialogue that protects democratic processes and at the same time reins
in those processes, especially as they work to erode the fundamental principle of
equality itself. No conservative in America deserving of the title could fail to
appreciate the whole of American tradition, including this perhaps unusual but
fundamental part of it. A conservative approach to equal protection, then, is to see it
as a part ofthe national framework, appreciate its critique of some existing practices,
and apply that critique in an incremental fashion and pace that causes minimal
disruption to the whole.2"
Although Burke would have been unfamiliar with the specifics of the American
equality principle as it has developed over the past two centuries, and especially since
the Fourteenth Amendment, he could surely have appreciated the application of it as
the defense of a higher principle against existing practices. In America, political
equality is an "ancient opinion" or "old prejudice" that a Burkean conservative does
not lightly toss to the side.245
Certainly full legal equality for gays-which exists nowhere in America thanks to
a patchwork of sodomy laws, the military ban, the gay-mairiage prohibitions, and a
host of other legal rules-would work a dramatic change on the face ofAmerican law
at the local, state, and national levels. But in some sense, it would do nothing more
than give life and meaning to a venerated American tradition: the idea of political
equality. That idea must apply even to "the obnoxious and the suspected"246 people,
like gays, who are nevertheless part of the whole.
Some conservative legal scholars, like Bork, have made room for the adaptation of
constitutional principle to intervening experience and understanding. Evans falls
squarely in this mold. Since it does not require instant legal equality for gays-a
mandate that would be very controversial and unpopular to say the least-Evansdoes
not take the path some conservatives thought the Court took in the Warren Court era

244. Cf.EUOT, supra note 136, at 92 (stating that reform must "avoid, inputting one thing
right, putting something else wrong").
245. See supra Part II.C.
246. Letter to the Sheriffs, supra note 108, at 206.
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by forcing dramatic social change on an unwilling populace. 7
Rather, bypreserving the power of local governments in Colorado and other states
to adopt gay civil-rights laws as they see fit, Evans protects the process of consensus
building that is so important to deliberative democracy. 4 1 One criticism of Roe v.
Wade, 9 the most detested Supreme Court opinion for many judicial conservatives,
is that it foreclosed the development of a deliberated consensus on abortion.' 0 It was
a top-down command foreclosing further political deliberation." Similarly,
Amendment 2 attempted to end the development of a political consensus at the local
level in Colorado." 2 Like the result in Roe v. Wade, Amendment 2 was an order to
shut down more localized democratic deliberation." 3
Homosexual equality is, to be sure, an area of consensus building not specifically
envisioned by any framer of the 1787 Constitution or the Fourteenth Amendment. But
that fact alone should not trouble a conservative who believes we have a legitimate
Burkean interest in applying constitutional principle to changed times.
Evans permits the evolution of c6nsensus in the direction of political equality for
gays, a process that Amendment 2 attempted to foreclose in Colorado. By making
gays unequal to other citizens, by permitting the law to "see particular men with a
malignant eye,"" Amendment 2 eroded this principle.
Recall that Burke believed the absence of equality would dissolve the community
itself."5 For a conservative, no person is by nature the ruler of another. By singling
gays out as a class, and then declaring that that class should have inferior access to
the usual processes for obtaining legal relief, Amendment 2 made every heterosexual
citizen of Colorado the ruler of every homosexual citizen. Like a decision of
Parliament to withdraw habeas corpus protection from only those citizens who
happened to be out of the country at a particular time, Amendment 2 denied the
possi'bility of true political community. This, for a conservative embracing the
concept of equal political participation, the state should not be allowed to do.
C. Evans and the Madisonian Dilemma
Evans can also be defended on conservative grounds as answering the central
concerns of the Framers regarding the abuse of powers by a majority faction against

247. Cf BORK, supra note 13, at 129-30; NASH, supra note 145, at 214-15.
248. NASH, supra note 145, at 213-15.
249. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
250. Cf NASH, supra note 145, at 215 ("[W]hile nine judges can draw up a fixed
constitutional provision withoutthe authority of a hard constitutional consensus, their decision
cannot be reversed except on the authority of a hard constitutional consensus." (emphasis in
original)).
251. Some such top-down commands are surelyjustified bythe Constitution, which protects
some rights against even deliberative democracy.
252. States are generally free, of course, to require that certain decisions be made at the state
instead of at the local level. But under Evans they may not do so in a way that violates the
principle of equal protection.
253. I am indebted to David McGowan for drawing my attention to this similarity.
254. Letter to the Sheriffs, supra note 108, at 191.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
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a minority. To Madison, it did not matter whether the faction animated by hostility
to another group constituted "a majority or [a] minority."' The dilemma for the new
republic created by the 1787 Constitution was how to deal effectively with these
factions while at the same time retaining the practice of self-government." 7 One
conservative scholar, commenting on Amendment 2, concluded: "Such class
legislation was of paramount concern to the Constitution's framers, who worried
about the power of 'factions' to manipulate the coercive power of government for
their own ends." 8
Madison defined a faction as a group "of citizens ... who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens."" 9 On one level, this definition might be thought to encompass virtually all
democratic decisionmaking, since every decision is necessarily the product of a
legislative (or voting) majority motivated sufficiently to act in some fashion. Often,
the democratic result will be detrimental to the interests of an identifiable group
within the polity.
But ordinary democratic decisionmaking cannot have been Madison's principal
2
concern since the Framers wanted to make self-government possible and lasting. "
Rather, Madison focused on the idea that the faction is driven by a "passion," or an
that it becomes "overbearing" and seeks to enforce
"impulse," to such an extent
"schemes of oppression.""26 Madison was concerned about nondeliberative
decisionmaking. That is, he was concerned with decisions that result from a pure
desire to oppress, an unreasoned backlash against a group, produced not by any
studied weighing of alternatives but by demagoguery and invective.
Evans confronts nothing more or less than the enactment of an aroused Madisonian
faction of the majority. Justice Kennedy's opinion paints Amendment 2 as being
"inexplicable by anything but animus toward the class it affects." ' 2 Justice Kennedy
'
It
explained that Amendment 2 "[was] born of animosity toward [homosexuals]."263
2
was enacted with the purpose ofmaking gays "unequal to everyone else." " Whether
or not Justice Kennedy is correct about the purpose of Amendment 2-though
evidence fromthe campaign that preceded its passage supports his conclusion 26 5-his
concern is a traditional Madisonian one about a faction of the majority run amok.2'
Amendment 2, Justice Kennedy seems to say, has no purpose other than to serve as

256. THE FEDERALST NO. 10, supra note 167, at 17.
257. Id. at 16 ("Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the
violence of faction.").
258. Clint Bolick, Editorial, Beyond Gay Rights: 'Romer' Court Struck a Blow for
IndividualsAgainst Government, L.A. DAILY J., June 4, 1996, at 16.
259. THE FEDERAIST NO. 10, supra note 167, at 17.
260. Id. at 16.
261. Id. at 17,20.
262. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996).
263. Id. at 634.
264. Id. at 635.
265. See Jackson, supranote 24, at 459-60.
266. TIE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 167, at 19-20.
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a constitutionally impermissible "scheme[] of oppression. '
For Madison, the danger that such a scheme could be enacted was compounded
where it occurred through direct, rather than representative, democracy."8
Amendment 2 was, of course, an example of direct democracy at work. This is not
to argue that democracy by referendum is unconstitutional--it certainly is not. Rather,
it suggests that popular plebiscite is especially likely to reflect aroused factional
passions. 2"'
Since direct democracy of the sort represented by Amendment 2 was not available
in Burke's England, it is not possible to say with certainty how he would have reacted
to such a process. But Burke's view of governance as deliberative and driven by
reason applied by leaders exercising independent judgment, rather than by "different
27 suggests that he
and hostile interests,""
would not have viewed it as a proper
substitute for representative government.
Justice Kennedy's opinion also echoes Burke's concern that a democratic majority

is "capable of exercising the most cruel oppressions upon the minority.""27 Burke
described the minority so besieged-in stark and evocative terms-as being
"deprived of all external consolation" and "deserted by mankind, overpowered by a
conspiracy of their whole species."'272 In other words, Burke saw that a democracy
might attempt to isolate an unpopular minority.
A similar concern about the isolating effect of Amendment 2 on gays rings
throughout Justice Kennedy's opinion. "Homosexuals, by state decree," he wrote,
"are put in a solitary class with respect to transactions and relations inboth the private
and governmental spheres."2 3 He concluded that, bypassing Amendment 2, Colorado
' Justice Kennedy's
made the gay community "a stranger to its laws."274
opinion thus
reflects the Burkean conservative's concern that democratic action not be allowed to
isolate and target a group of citizens.
The Framers' understanding sheds light on our constitutional design, particularly
as it relates to the principle of equal access to the political process. This does not,
however, call into question every state action or other legal barrier to change
requiring a supermajority to be revoked. It does call into question those state actions
that specifically identify groups of people for the purpose of burdening their
participation in the political process.
Thus, an amendment outlawing gambling does not violate equal protection for
gamblers because the focus of the hypothetical amendment is the activity
prohibited-not the members defined by the activity or those with a "gambler's
orientation."

267. Id. at 20.
268. Id. ("[A] pure democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can admit of no cure for the
mischiefs of faction .... Hence it is that such democracies have ever been spectacles of
turbulence and contention ..... (footnote omitted)).
269. Id. at 18.
270. Letter to the Sheriffs, supra note 108, at 187.
271. BURKE, supra note 99, at 144.

272. Id.
273. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 627 (1996).
274. Id. at 635.
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On the other hand, an amendment that prohibited gamblers qua gamblers from
seeking protection from discrimination mightbe suspect under the Evans analysis. It
does not matter that Amendment 2 did not use the words "homosexuals may not seek
protection as homosexuals"; the effect of Amendment 2 was to do exactly that. As the
Court suggested in Evans, Amendment 2 was a status-based, not a conduct-based,
enactment." 5
Evans leaves open the possibility that a legislative action to strip all groups of legal
protections across the board would be constitutional, while a measure to strip a single
group of all legal protection from discrimination is not. Some conservative
276
commentators have called this potential result"anomalous" and "counterintuitive."
It is nothing of the kind. The equal protection clause means that what the polity is
ready to apply to one group of citizens it must apply to all citizens. The requirement
that a legislative enactment must have general application-including application to
the majority itself-is a structural protection for political minorities built into the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Burke would certainly have understood this aspect of the American equal
protection tradition. Recall that Burke objected most vehemently to Parliament's
partial suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act because it operated only against some
citizens, those who had been out of the realm for a prescribed time, rather than
against all."7 Presaging the rationale for the structural protections of minorities built
into the Fourteenth Amendment, Burke wrote:

[Ut is never the faction of the predominant power that is in danger: for no tyranny
chastises its own instruments. It is the obnoxious and suspected who want the
protection of the law; and there is nothing to bridle the partial violence of state
factions but this---"that, whenever an act is made for a cessation of law and
justice, the whole people should be universally subjected to the same suspension
of their franchises.""27
The problem, as Burke saw it, was that under the selective provisions of the act "the
lawful magistrate may see particular men with a malignant eye." 279
A proposal to strip everyone of statutory legal protection from discrimination-a
proposal whose passage would survive my reading of Evans-would probably be
unpopular politically precisely because it would mean that members of the majority
would themselves be stripped of protection. This they are unlikely to do. However,
stripping someone else of legal protection may appeal to them just as "schemes of
oppression ' appealed to Madison's hypothetical faction of the majority and"partial
'
violence" appealed to Burke's "faction of the predominant power."281
In short, America's political and legal tradition, as conservative authors have
pointed out, includes the protection of individual liberty and equal application of the

275.
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277.
278.
279.
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Dailey & Farley, supra note 5, at 258-59.
See supra text accompanying notes 155-57.
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laws. This country, at its best, has welcomed those who do not conform to others'
judgments about what they should be.
Burke understood this. Explaining Americans' fierce love of liberty to Parliament,
Burke noted that many colonists were dissenters from the established religions in
their homelands who sought refuge in the New World. The colonists from England
were largely Protestant, which, according to Burke, "even the most cold and passive,
is a sort of dissent."'' Further, those who arrived in America from outside England
were largely "dissenters from the [religious] establishments of their several
countries."283

Even to an Eighteenth Century observer across the Atlantic, then, it was obvious
what sort of legacy America was building: one in which people with widely different
views about the most fundamental parts of life were to live in one country. The legal
expression of that legacy of heterodoxy and tolerance ofheterodoxyhas been, among
other things, our commitment to the equal protection of the laws.
The most shameful moments in our constitutional history have been those times
when we abandoned that fundamental commitment to satisfy the felt needs of
momentary passion, as when we permitted states to segregate the races,2 or forced
Jehovah's Witnesses to salute the flag," 5 or rounded up Japanese Americans and put
them in internment camps,2 orprohibited interracial marriage, 2 or excluded women
from the practice of law,"8 or prevented the children of illegal aliens from attending
public schools,2" 9 or put gay men and women into a solitary class and made that class
a "stranger to our laws."' These epiphenomena should not survive a principled
conservative critique.
CONCLUSION

"One century ago, the first Justice Harlan admonished this Court that the
Constitution 'neither knows nor tolerates classes among its citizens."'29!
I remember very clearly the first time I read those words, the opening sentence of
Romer v. Evans. It was late May 1996, and I was sitting in my office, with the door

282. Speech on Conciliation, supra note 119, at 160.
283. Id.
284. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding state-imposed public racial
segregation), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
285. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding flag-salute
requirement), overruledby W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
286. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding internment of Japanese
Americans).
287. Pacev.Alabama, 106 U.S. 583(1883) (upholding antimiscegenation statute), overruled
in partby McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
288. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1 Wall.) (1873) (upholding state law excluding
women from practice of law).
289. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 205 (1982) (striking down a state law that denied "state
funds for the education of children who were not 'legally admitted' to the United States').
290. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,635 (1996) (quoting Plessyv. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537,
559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
291. Id. at 620.
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closed, alone. I had just been informed that the gay civil rights group of which I was
then president, the Log Cabin Republicans of Texas, would not be allowed to have
a six-foot wide information booth at the state GOP convention to be held the next
month. It was the type of booth that every group from pro-choice activists to salsa
vendors was routinely allowed to purchase in a large exhibit area right outside the
convention hall. The reason for the denial, according to the executive director of the
state party, was that "sodomy is illegal in Texas." I knew what she meant. To her, we
were disqualified because we were gay and only dared to think we should have an
equal place in the country. Before Evans, it seemed to me that the weight of the law
was on her side. I was, by virtue of being gay, outside the law. I was not a citizen.
The United States was not my country.
When I saw, in this single sentence, the Court link gays to a national tradition of
bringing outcast people in from the cold, I knew something profound had changed,
if not entirely in the law, then at least in our hearts. Two months later, when I was
scheduled to speak in defense of the decision before the Houston chapter of the
Federalist Society, some members threatened to resign in protest. Yet the local
leaders of the group and the national executive director refused to cancel my
appearance. Two federal judges, both conservative Republican appointees, had a
hand in introducing me at the meeting. Change comes in small ways and in slim
moments.
The Supreme Court's decision in Evans is consistent with conservatives'
preference for slow, incremental change in society. It is consistent with the nation's
foundational tradition of political equality for all citizens. And it answers the
concerns expressed by the Framers that the polity not be ruled by aroused factions
bent on employing schemes of oppression. All three of these justifications for the
decision are consistent with traditionalist conservatism.
Nevertheless, Evans is, and for some time to come likely will continue to be, an
unpopular decision among political and judicial conservatives. I suspect that much
of conservatives' dismay with Evans has less to do with principled constitutional
jurisprudence than it does with conservatives' general discomfort with gays. Evans
is seen by many conservatives as the first step down a long road of changing
cherished and long-standing beliefs about the legal and social standing of gays in
American society. But, in a sense, Evansis no different than the similar first, tentative
steps taken by courts and by political institutions on behalf of women,2" racial
minorities,' and other disfavored groups.""
Over time, conservatives will make their peace with the idea of equality for gays,
just as conservatives have slowly made peace with the idea of equality for AfricanAmericans and women. No less a conservative icon than Barry Goldwater, to many
the father of the modem conservative political movement in the United States,
accepted gay equality before his death." "'It's time America realized that there was

292. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (first case in which the Supreme Court invalidated
a law because it discriminated based on sex).
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no gay exemption in the right to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' in the
Declaration of Independence,"' he said in defense of ajob-discrimination bill similar
to the ones struck down by Amendment 2.296 "'Job discrimination against gays,"' he
added, "'is contrary to these founding principles.""'29 On allowing gays to serve
openly in the military, he was just as unequivocal: "'You don't need to be straight to
fight and die for your country .... You just need to shoot straight.""'2 8
Evans has aided the process of accommodating conservatives to the idea of gay
equality by linking that idea to the nation's most cherished traditions. The Court
viewed Amendment 2 as just another case where, aroused by a momentary passion,
we temporarily abandoned our constitutional commitment to political equality. Read
again Justice Kennedy's words: "It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact
laws of this sort." Whatever else may be said about it, that is a profoundly
conservative sentiment. The real radicals, the Court seems tobe saying, were the ones
who would discard our commitment to political equality where gay citizens are
concerned. In this sense, Romer v. Evans was a revolution prevented, not achieved.
It was a conservative triumph.
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